Malware detection is an ever-present challenge for all organizational gatekeepers. Organizations o en deploy numerous di erent malware detection tools, and then combine their output to produce a nal classi cation for an inspected le. is approach has two signi cant drawbacks. First, it requires large amounts of computing resources and time since every incoming le needs to be analyzed by all detectors. Secondly, it is di cult to accurately and dynamically enforce a prede ned security policy that comports with the needs of each organization (e.g., how tolerant is the organization to false negatives and false positives). In this study we propose ASPIRE, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based method for malware detection. Our approach receives the organizational policy -de ned solely by the perceived costs of correct/incorrect classi cations and of computing resources -and then dynamically assigns detection tools and sets the detection threshold for each inspected le. We demonstrate the e ectiveness and robustness of our approach by conducting an extensive evaluation on multiple organizational policies. ASPIRE performed well in all scenarios, even achieving near-optimal accuracy of 96.21% (compared to an optimum of 96.86%) at approximately 20% of the running time of this baseline.
INTRODUCTION
Malware detection is an ever-present problem for organizations, o en with signi cant consequences [2] . Speci cally, Portable Executable (PE) les are one of the most signi cant platforms for malware to spread. PEs are common in the Windows operating systems, and are used by executables and dynamic link libraries (DLLs), among others. e PE format is essentially a data structure which holds all the necessary information for the Windows loader to execute the wrapped code.
Malware constantly evolve as a ackers try to evade detection solutions, the most common of which being the anti-virus. Anti-virus solutions mostly perform static analysis of the so ware's binary to detect pre-de ned signatures, a trait that renders them ine ective in recognizing new malware even if similar functionality has been recorded. Moreover, obfuscation techniques such as polymorphism and metamorphism [33] further exacerbate the problem.
e need to deal with the continuously evolving threats led to signi cant developments in the malware detection eld in recent years. Instead of searching for pre-de ned signatures within the executable le, new approaches a empt to analyze the behaviour of the portable executable (PE) le.
ese method o en rely on statistical analysis and machine learning (ML) as their decision making mechanism, and can generally be thought of as belonging to one of two families: static analysis and dynamic analysis [18] . In this study we focus on the static analysis techniques.
Static analysis techniques [29] employ an in-depth look at the le, without performing any execution. Solutions implementing static analysis can be either signature-based or statistics-based. Signaturebased detection is the more widely used approach [6] because of its simplicity, relative speed and its e ectiveness against known malware. Despite these advantages, signature-based detection has three major drawback: it requires frequent updates of its signature database, it cannot detect unknown (i.e., zero-day) malware [6] , and it is vulnerable to obfuscation techniques [33] .
Statistics-based detection mainly involves the extraction of features from the executable, followed by training of a machine learning classi er. e extracted features are varied and may include executable le format descriptions [19] , code descriptions [23] , binary data statistics [17] , text strings [5] and information extracted using code emulation or similar methods [33] .
is approach is considered more e ective than its signature-based counterpart in detecting previously unknown malware -mostly due to its use of machine learning (ML) [3, 5, 7, 10, 23] -but tends to be less accurate overall [20] . For this reason, organizations o en deploy an ensemble of multiple behavioural and statistic detectors, and then combine their scores to produce a nal classi cation. is process of producing this classi cation can be achieved through simple heuristics (e.g., averaging) or by more advanced ML algorithms [12] .
Despite its e ectiveness, the ensemble approach has two significant shortcomings. First, using an ensemble requires that organizations run all participating detection tools prior to classifying a le. is practice is needed both in order to make scoring consistent and because most ML algorithms (like those o en used to reach the nal ensemble decision) require a xed-size feature set. Running all detectors is time and resource intensive and is o en not necessary for clear-cut cases. is practice results in "wasted" computing resources. Moreover, the introduction or removal of a detector o en requires that the entire ML model be retrained, a fact that limits exibility and the organization's ability to respond to new threats. e second shortcoming of the ensemble approach is the diculty of implementing the organizational security policy. When using ML-based solutions for malware detection, the only "tool" available for organizations to set their policy is the nal con dence score: les above a certain score are blocked, while the rest are allowed in. Under this se ing it is di cult to de ne the cost of a false-negative compared to that of a false-positive or to quantify the cost of running additional detectors. In addition to being hard to de ne, such security policies are also hard to re ne: minor changes to the con dence score threshold may result in large uctuations in performance (e.g., signi cantly raising the number of false-alarms).
In this study we propose ASPIRE, a reinforcement learning-based framework for managing a malware detection platform consisting of multiple malware detection tools. For each le, our approach sequentially queries various detectors, deciding a er each step whether to further analyze the le or produce a nal classi cation. ASPIRE's decision-making process is governed by a pre-de ned reward function that awards points for correct classi cations and applies penalties for misclassi cation and heavy use of computing resources.
Our approach has two advantages over existing ensemble-based solutions. First, it is highly e cient, since easy-to-classify les are likely to only require the use of less-powerful (i.e. e cient) classi ers. We can therefore maintain near-optimal performance at a fraction of the computing cost. Secondly, organizations can clearly and deliberately de ne and re ne their security policy. We achieve this goal by enabling practitioners to explicitly de ne the costs to each element of the detection process: correct/incorrect classi cation and resource usage. Our contributions in this study are threefold:
• we present a reinforcement learning-based approach for ensemble-based malware detection. Our approach was able to achieve near-optimal accuracy of 96.21% (compared to an optimum of 96.86%) at approximately 20% of the running time of this baseline.
• we conduct an extensive analysis of multiple security policies, designed to simulate the needs and goals of a di erent organizational types. In addition to demonstrating the robustness of our approach, we analyze the e ect of various policy preferences on detection accuracy and resource use.
• we release the dataset used in our evaluation for general use. In addition to the les themselves, we release for each le the con dence scores and meta-data of each of the malware detectors used in our experiments. .
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section we provide a general overview of deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithms and their advantages. We then elaborate on our motivation in applying them to eld of malware detection.
Deep Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) is an area of machine learning that addresses decision making in complex scenarios, possibly when only partial information is available. e ability of RL algorithms to explore the large solution spaces and devise highly e cient policies to address them (especially when coupled with deep learning) was shown to be highly e ective in areas such as robotics and control problems [21] , genetic algorithms [26] , and achieving super-human performance in complex games [25] .
RL tasks normally consist of both an agent and an environment. e agent interacts with the environment E in a sequence of actions and rewards. At each time-step t, the agent selects an action a t from A = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a k } that both modi es the state of the environment and also incurs a reward r t . Reward can be either positive or negative 1 . For each given task (in our case, the classi cation of a single le), the goal of the agent is to interact with the environment in a way that maximizes future rewards R t = T t r t where T is the index of the nal action (i.e., classi cation decision).
A frequent approach for selecting the action to be taken at each state is the action-value function Q(s, a) [27] . e function approximates the expected returns should we take action a at state s. While the methods are varied, RL algorithms which use Q-functions aim to discover (or closely approximate) the optimal action-value function Q * which is de ned as Q * (s, a) = max π E[R t |s t = s, a t = a, π ] where π is the policy mapping states to actions [27] . Since estimating Q for every possible state-action combination is highly impractical [14] , it is common to use an approximator Q(s, a; θ ) ≈ Q * (s, a) where θ represents the parameters of the approximator. Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithm perform this approximation using neural nets, with θ being the parameters of the network.
While RL algorithms strive to maximize the reward based on their current knowledge about the world (i.e., exploitation), it is important to also encourage the exploration of other additional states. Many methods for maintaining this exploration/exploitation balance have been o ered in the literature, including importance sampling [22] , ϵ-greedy sampling [30] and Monte-Carlo Tree search [24] . In this study, we use ϵ-greedy sampling.
Actor-critic algorithms for reinforcement learning. Two common problems in the application of DRL algorithms is the long time they need to converge due to high variance (i.e., uctuations) in gradient values, and the need to deal with action sequences with a cumulative reward of zero (zero reward equals zero gradients, hence no parameter updates). ese challenges can be addressed by using actor-critic methods, consisting of a critic neural net that estimates the Q-function and an actor neural net that updates the policy according to the critic. e use two separate networks have been shown to reduce variance and accelerate model convergence during training. In our experiments we use the actor-critic with experience replay (ACER) algorithm [32] . Experience replay [13] is a method for re-introducing the model to previously seen samples in order to prevent catastrophic forge ing (i.e., forge ing previously learned scenarios while tackling new ones).
Motivation
e ever-evolving threat of malware creates an incentive for organizations to diversify their detection capabilities. As a result, organizations o en install multiple solutions [11] and run them all for every incoming le. is approach is both costly -in computing resources, processing time, and even the cost of electricity -and o en unnecessary since most les can be easily classi ed. 1 Please note that for convenience we use the term "cost" to describe negative rewards A logical solution to this problem would be using a small number of detectors for clear-cut cases and a larger ensemble for di cultto-analyze les. is approach, however, is challenging to implement for two reasons. e rst challenge is assigning the right set of detectors for each le. Ideally, we would like this set to be large enough to be accurate but also as small as possible so it is computationally-e cient. Striking this balance is by no means a trivial task, especially when a large number of detectors is available.
e second challenge is the fact that di erent organizations have di erent preferences when faced with the need to balance detection accuracy, error-tolerance, and the cost of computing resources. Using these preference to guide detector selection is an open and di cult problem.
To the best of our knowledge, every existing ensemble solution requires running all detectors prior to producing a classi cation.
is requirement is a result of the supervised learning algorithm (e.g., SVM, Random Forest) o en used for this purpose. As a result, not only are existing solution unable to address the rst challenge we mention, they are also extremely constrained in addressing the second.
Even a er se ing aside the issue of computational cost (which is moot due to the use of all detectors for each le), striking the right balance between di erent types of classi cation errors -falsepositive (FP) and false negative (FN) -remains a challenge. Usually, the only "tool" available for managing this trade-o is the con dence threshold, a value in the range of [0,1] designating the level of certainty by the classi er of the le being malicious. Aside from being a blunt instrument (small changes in this value can cause large uctuations in detection performance), recent studies [8] suggest that the con dence score is not as reliable an indicator as commonly assumed. e use of reinforcement learning o ers an elegant solution to both problems. First, this type of algorithms enables practitioners to assign clear numeric values to each classi cation outcome, as well as to quantify the cost of computing resources. ese values re ect the priorities of the organization, and can be easily adapted and re ned as needed. Secondly, once these values have been set, the reinforcement learning algorithm automatically a empts to de ne a policy (i.e., strategy) that maximizes them. is policy is likely to re ect organizational priorities much more closely than the use of a con dence threshold. Finally, since reinforcement learning algorithms are designed to operate based on partial knowledge, there is no need to run all detectors in advance; the algorithm interactively selects a single detector, evaluates its performance and then determines whether the bene t of using additional detectors is likely to be worth their computational cost. Moreover, the selection of detectors is dynamic, with di erent detector combinations used for di erent scenarios.
ASPIRE: AUTOMATED SECURITY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION USING REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
In this research we present ASPIRE, an automated security policy implementation using reinforcement learning. e goal of our approach is to automatically learn a security policy that best ts organizational requirements. More speci cally, we train a deep neural network to dynamically determine when su cient information exists to classify a given le and when more analysis is needed. e policy produced by our approach is shaped based on the values (i.e., rewards and costs) assigned to correct and incorrect le classi cations, as well as to the use of computing resources. We introduce a RL framework that explores the e cacy of various detector combinations and continuously performs cost-bene t analysis to select optimal detector combinations. e main challenge in selecting detector combinations can be modelled as an exploration/exploitation problem. While the cost (i.e., computing resources) of using a detector can be very closely approximated in advance, its bene t (i.e., the usefulness of the analysis) can only be known in retrospect. RL algorithms perform well in scenarios with high uncertainty where only partial information is available, a fact that makes them highly suitable for the task at hand. ASPIRE's architecture, describing the interaction between the agent and the environment, is presented in Figure 1 . We next present the state and action-spaces used by our approach and describe the cost/reward structure used in our experiments and the rationale of se ing di erent security policies for di erent types of organizations.
States.
e states that make up our environment consist of all possible score combinations by the participating detectors. More speci cally, for a malware detection environment consisting of K detectors, each possible state will be represented by a vector 
Actions. e number of possible actions corresponds directly with the number of available detectors in the environment. For an environment consisting of K detectors, the number of actions will be K + 2: one action for the activation of each detector, and two additional actions called "malicious" and "benign". Each of the two la er actions produces a classi cation decision for the analyzed le, while also terminating the analysis process.
Rewards. e rewards need to be designed so that they re ect the organizational security policy, namely the tolerance for errors in the detection process and the cost of using computing resources:
• Detection errors. We need to consider two types of errors: false-positives (FP), which is the agging of a benign le as malicious (i.e., a "false alarm"), and false-negative (FN), which is the agging of a malicious le as benign. In addition to the negative rewards incurred by misclassication, it is also possible to provide positive reward for cases where the algorithm was correct. We elaborate on this further in Section 5 and present the various scoring schemes used in our evaluation.
• Computing resources. In this study we chose the time required to run a detector as the approximated cost of its activation. In addition to being a close approximator of other types of resources use (e.g., CPU, memory), running time is a clear indicator of an organization's ability to process large volumes of incoming les. To put it simply, reducing the average time required to process a le enables organizations to process more les with less hardware.
When designing the reward function for the analysis runtime, we needed to address the large di erence in this measure between various detectors. As shown in Table 2 in Section 4.2, average running times can vary by orders of magnitude (from 0.7s to 44.29s, depending on the detector). In order to mitigate these di erences and encourage the use of the more "expensive" (but also more accurate) detectors, we de ne the cost function of the computing time as follows
It is important to note that while we only consider running time as the computing resource whose cost needs to be taken into account, our approach can be easily adapted to include additional resources such as memory usage, CPU runtime, cloud computing costs and even electricity. As such, ASPIRE enables organizations to easily and automatically integrate all relevant costs into their decision making process, something that has not been possible before with other ML-based approaches.
DATASET MALWARE DETECTION ANALYSIS
Our dataset consists of 24,737 PE les, equally divided between malicious and benign. While we were unable to determine the creation time of each le, all les were collected from the repositories of the network security department of a large organization in October 2018. We analyze each le using four di erent malware detectors, and make both the le corpus and the classi cation scores publicly available. 2 In the remainder of this section we rst describe the detectors used in our experiments and then analyze their performance -both in absolute terms and in relation to each other.
e Detectors
Our selection of detectors was guided by three objectives:
• O -the-shelf so ware. e ability to use malware detection solution without any special adaptation demonstrates that our approach is generic and easily applicable.
• Proven detection capabilities. By using detectors that are also in use in real-world organizations we ensure the validity of our experiments.
• Run-time variance. Since the goal of our experiments is to demonstrate ASPIRE's ability to perform cost-e ective detection (with running time being our chosen cost metric), using detection solutions that vary in their resource requirements was deemed preferable. Moreover, such variance is consistent with real-world detection pipelines that combine multiple detector "families" [11] .
Following the above-mentioned objectives, we selected four detectors to be included in our dataset: pe le, byte3g, opcode2g, and manalyze.
pe le. is detector uses seven features extracted from the PE header: DebugSize, ImageVersion, IatRVA, ExportSize, ResourceSize, VirtualSize2, and NumberOfSections, all presented in [19] . Using those features, we trained a Decision Tree classi er to produce the classi cation.
byte3g. is detector uses features extracted from the raw binaries of the PE le [17] . First, it constructs trigrams (3-grams) of bytes. Secondly, it computes the trigrams term-frequencies (TF), which are the raw counts of each trigram in the entire le. irdly, we calculate the document-frequencies (DF), which represent the rarity of a trigram in the entire dataset. Lastly, since the amount of features can be substantial (up to 256 3 ), we use the top 300 DF-valued features for classi cation. Using the selected features, we trained a Random Forest classi er with 100 trees.
opcode2g. is detector uses features based on the disassembly of the PE le [16] . First, it disassembles the le and extract the opcode of each instruction. Secondly, it generates bigrams (2-grams) representation of the opcodes.
irdly, both the TF and DF values are computed for each bigram. Lastly, as done for byte3g, we 2 Links to all materials will be provided pending acceptance.
select the 300 features with the highest DF values. Using the selected features, we trained a Random Forest classi er with 100 trees.
manalyze. is detector is a based on open-source heuristic scanning tool named Manalyze 3 .
is detector o ers multiple types of static analysis capabilities for PE les, each implemented in a separate "plugin". In our version we included the following capabilities: packed executables detection, ClamAV and YARA signatures, detection of suspicious import combinations, detection of cryptographic algorithms, and the veri cation of authenticode signatures. Each plugin returns one of three values: benign, possibly malicious, and malicious. Since Manalyze does not o er an out-of-the-box method for combining the plugin scores, we trained a Decision Tree classi er with the plugins' scores as features.
Detectors Performance Analysis
In this section we analyze and compare the performance of the various detectors. We explore the e ectiveness of various detector combinations and explain why the selection of only a subset of possible detectors is likely to produce near-optimal performance at a much lower computational cost.
Overall detector performance. We begin by analyzing the upper bound on the detection capability of our four detectors. In Table 1 we present a breakdown of all les in our dataset as a function of the number of times they were incorrectly classi ed by the various detectors. All detectors were trained and tested using 10-fold crossvalidation, and we present an average of the results. We de ne Incorrect classi cation as a con dence threshold above 0.5 for a benign le or one that is equal or smaller than 0.5 for a malicious le. Table 1 show that approximately 73% of all les are classi ed correctly by all detectors, while only 0.65% (160 les) are not detectable by any method. We derive two conclusions from this analysis: a) Approximately ∼26.5% of the les in our dataset potentially require that we use multiple detectors to achieve correct classi cation; b) only a small percentage of les (1.6%) is correctly classi ed by a single classi er, which means that applying all four detectors for a given le is hardly ever required. We argue that these conclusions support our hypothesis that a cost-e ective approach for using only a subset of possible detectors.
Absolute and relative detector performance. Our goal in this analysis is rst to present the performance (i.e., detection rate) of each detector, and then determine whether any classi er is dominated by another (thus making it redundant, unless it is more computationally e cient). We begin our analysis by presenting the absolute performance of each detector. As can be seen in Table 2 , the accuracy of the detectors ranges between 82.88%-95.5%, with the more computationally-expensive detectors generally achieving the be er performance. Next we a empted to determine whether any detector is dominated by another. For each detector, we analyzed the les it misclassi ed in order to determine whether they would be correctly classi ed by another detector. e results of this analysis, presented in Table 3 , show that no detector is being dominated. Moreover, the large variance in the detection rates of other detectors for misclassi ed les further suggests that an intelligent selection of detector subsets -where the detectors complement each other -can yield high detection accuracy. Figure 3 . While it is clear that all detectors assign either 0s or 1s to the majority of les, a large number of les (particularly for the less-expensive, 
Detectors combinations performance and time consumption.
Finally, we provide a comprehensive analysis on the performance and time consumption for all possible detector combinations, presented in Table 4 . To evaluate the performance of each combination, we aggregated the con dence score using three di erent methods, presented in [12] . e rst method, or, classi es a le as malicious if any of the participating detectors classi es it as such (yields a score of 0.5 and above). is method mostly improves the sensitivity, but at the cost of higher false-positives percentage (benign les classi ed as malicious). e second method, majority, uses voting to classify the les. e third method, stacking, combines the classi cation con dence scores by training a ML model, with the scores provided as its features. In our evaluation, we used two types of classi ers -Decision Tree (DT) and Random Forest (RF) -and evaluated each using 10-fold cross-validation. Interestingly, our analysis shows that in the case of majority, the optimal performance is not achieved by combining all classiers, but rather only three of them. Furthermore, some detector combinations (manalyze, pe le, byte3g) outperform other detector sets while also being more computationally e cient. e results further support our claim that an intelligent selection of detector combinations is highly important.
It should be noted that for each le, the times were measured in an isolated computer process on a dedicated machine to prevent other processes interruptions. In addition, the machines executing the detectors were identical utilizing the same hardware and rmware speci cations.
EVALUATION
To the best of our knowledge, this study represents the rst a empt to cra a security policy by performing a cost-bene t analysis that takes into account the resources required to use various detectors. In this section we evaluate the performance of our proposed approach in several scenarios and demonstrate its e ectiveness. Moreover, we show that simple adjustments to our algorithm's reward function (which re ects the organization's priorities) leads to signi cant changes in the detection strategy. We argue that this approach is more e ective (and intuitive) than existing approaches. e remainder of this section is organized as follows: we begin by describing the environment used for running our experiments. Next, we describe our experimental setup and evaluated scenarios. Finally, we present the results of our evaluation and o er an analysis.
e Evaluation Environment
We used three VMware ESXi servers, each containing two processing units (CPUs). Each server had a total of 32 cores, 512GB of RAM and 100TB of SSD disk space. Two servers were used to run the environment and its detectors, while the remaining server housed our DRL agent. In our experiments, we deployed two detectors in each server. is deployment se ing can easily be extended to include additional detectors or replicated to increase the throughput of existing ones. Our main goal in se ing up the environment was to demonstrate a large scale implementation which is both scalable and exible, thus ensuring its relevance to real-world scenarios. Figure 4 presents our infrastructure structure in detail. Both the agent processes and the detectors run on virtual machines with the Ubuntu 18.04 LTS operating system. Each machine has 4 CPU cores, 16GB of RAM and 100GB of SSD storage. e agent uses a management service that allows both the training and execution of the DRL algorithm, using di erent tuning parameters. Upon the arrival of a le for analysis, the agent stores it in a dedicated storage space, which is also accessible to all detectors running in the environment. e agent also utilizes an external storage to store le and detector-based features, all logging information, and the analysis output. All this information is later indexed and consumed by an analytics engine. e agent communicates with the environment over HTTP protocol.
Experimental Setup
e following se ings were used in all our experiments:
• We used 10-fold cross validation in all experiments, with label ratios maintained for each fold. e results presented in this study are the averages of all runs.
• We implemented the framework using Python v3.6. More speci cally, we used the ChainerRL 4 deep reinforcement library to create and train the agent, while the environment was implemented using the OpenAI Gym [4] . • We set our initial learning rate to 7e − 4, with exponential decay rate of 0.99 and a fuzz factor (epsilon) of 1e − 2. Our chosen optimizer was RMSprop [28] . In all experiments, our model trained until convergence.
• We set the size of the replay bu er to 5000. We start using it in the training process a er 10,000 episodes.
• In order to discourage the agent from querying the same detector twice (which is an obvious waste of resources, since no new information is gained), we de ne such actions to incur a very large cost of -10,000. e same " ne" applies to a empts to classify a le without using even a single detector.
Experimental Results
We hypothesize that our proposed ASPIRE approach has two major strengths: a) it can produce near-optimal performance at reduced computational cost; and b) e use of rewards enables us to easily de ne and tune our security policies by assigning a "personalized" set of detectors for each le.
To test the robustness of our approach, as well as its ability to generalize, we de ne ve use-cases with varying emphasis on correct/incorrect le classi cations and computational cost. e rewards composition of each use-case is presented in Table 5 , along with its overall accuracy and mean running time. It is important to note that the computational cost of using a detector is never calculated independently, but rather as a function of correct/incorrect le classi cation. Additionally, the computational costs of the malware detectors were de ned based on the average execution time of the les we used for training. is practice enabled the algorithm to converge faster. Our experiments show that this type of se ing outperforms other approaches for considering computational cost, as it strongly ties the invested resources to the classi cation outcome. Next we describe our ve use-cases and their rationale. Experiment 1. In this experiment we set both the reward for correct classi cation and the cost of incorrect classi cation to be equal to the cost of the running time. On one hand, this se ing "encourages" ASPIRE to invest more time analyzing incoming les and also provides higher rewards for the correct classi cation of more challenging les. On the other hand, the detector is discouraged from selecting detector con gurations that are likely to reduce its accuracy for a given le. Additionally, our approach is not likely to be inclined to pour additional resources into di cult-to-classify cases where the investment of more time is unlikely to provide additional information. Experiment 2. is se ing of this experiment is similar to that of experiment 1, except for the fact that the cost of incorrect classi cations is 10x higher than the reward for correct ones. We hypothesized that this se ing will cause the algorithm to be more risk-averse and invest additional resources in the classi cation of challenging les.
Please note that experiments 1 & 2 are not designed to assign high priority to resource e ciency, but instead focus on accuracy. e remaining experimental se ings are designed to give greater preference to the e cient use of resources.
Experiments 3-5. In this set of experiments we explore policies where the rewards assigned to correct classi cation are xed while the cost of incorrect classi cation depend on the amount of computing resources spent to reach the classi cation decision. We explore three variants of this approach, where the cost of incorrect classication remains the same but the rewards for correct classi cations are larger by one and two orders of magnitude (1, 10, and 100).
is set of experiments has two main goals: rst, since only the cost of an incorrect classi cation is time-dependent, we expect experiments 3-5 to be more e ciency-oriented. Our aim is to determine the size of this improvement and its e ect on the accuracy of our approach. Secondly, we are interested in exploring the e ect of varying reward/cost ratios on the policy generated by ASPIRE. Since we explore scenarios in which the reward for correct classi cations is either signi cantly smaller or larger than the cost of incorrect ones, our expectation was to obtain be er understanding of ASPIRE's decision mechanism.
Results. A summary of the results is presented in Table 5 while a detailed breakdown of the detector combinations used by by each of our generated DRL policies can be found in Table 6 . We present a detailed comparison of the results obtained by our various experiments is shown in Tables 7-10. Overall, the results show that ASPIRE is capable of generating highly e ective detection policies. e policies generated in experiments 1-2 outperformed all the methods presented in the baseline except for the top-performing one, which is a combination of all classi ers and the Random Forest algorithm. While this baseline method marginally outperforms our approach (98.86% to 96.81% and 96.79% for experiments 1 and 2 respectively), it is also slightly more computationally expensive (49.74 seconds on average compared with 49.63 and 49.58 for experiments 1 and 2 respectively). ese results are as we expected, since the policies we de ned for experiments 1 and 2 were geared towards accuracy rather than e ciency.
e policies generated by experiments 3-5 are more interesting, as they each achieve a di erent accuracy/e ciency balance. Moreover, each of the three policies was able to reach accuracy results that are equal or be er to those of the corresponding baselines at a much lower cost. e policy generated by experiment 3 reached an accuracy of 96.21% with a mean time of 10.5 seconds, compared with its closest baseline "neighbor" which achieved an accuracy of 96.3% in a mean time of of 48.28 seconds (almost ve time longer). Similarly, the policy produced by experiment 4 achieved the same accuracy as its baseline counterpart (pe le,opcode2g) while requiring only 3.68 seconds on average compared with the baseline's 45 seconds -a 92% improvement. e policy generated by experiment 5 requires 0.728 seconds per le on average, which is comparable to time required by the baseline method "pe le". Our approach, however, achieves higher accuracy (91.22% vs 90.6%).
Analysis
. Our experiments clearly demonstrate that security policy can be very e ectively managed through the use of di erent cost/reward combinations. Moreover, it is clear that the use of DRL o ers much greater exibility in the shaping of the security policy than the simple tweaking of the con dence threshold (the only available method for most ML-based detection algorithms). When analyzing the behavior (i.e., the detector selection strategy) of our policies, we nd that they behaved just as we could have expected. e policies generated by experiments 1 and 2 explicitly favored performance over e ciency, as the reward for correct classi cation was also time-dependent. As a result, they achieve very high accuracy but only a marginal improvement in e ciency. For experiments 3-5, the varying xed cost that we assigned to the correct classi cations played a deciding role in creating the policy. In experiment 3, the relative cost of a mistake was o en much larger than reward for a correct classi cation. erefore, the generated policy is cautious, achieving relatively high accuracy (but at impressive e ciency). In experiment 5, the cost of an incorrect classi cation is relatively marginal, a fact that motivates the generated policy to prioritize speed over accuracy. e policy generated by experiment 4 o ers the middle ground, reaching a slightly reduced accuracy compared with experiment 3, but managing to do so in about 33% of the running time.
Finally, we consider it important to elaborate on the major strength of our approach: the ability to cra a "personalized" set of detectors for each le. In Figure 5 of varying costs. is diversity helps to explain ASPIRE's ability to achieve high accuracy at much smaller computational cost. It is important to stress again that the detector combinations are not chosen in advance. Instead, they are chosen iteratively, with the con dence score of the already-applied detectors used to guide the next step chosen by the policy.
RELATED WORK 6.1 Malware Detection Techniques for PEs
Portable executable les can be represented in multiple ways, a fact that has contributed to the large number of approached proposed for its analysis. e most common (and simple) approach of representing a PE le is by calculating its hash value [9] . is method is frequently used by anti-virus engines to "mark" and identify malware, as both computing and retrieving hashes is fast and e cient.
Additional studies propose representing PEs using their binary data. Wan et al. [17] , for example, suggest using a dictionary of byte n-grams (sequences of n bytes) for malware classi cation. e authors examined di erent n-grams sizes ranging from three to six, as well as three feature selection methods. ey experimented with four types of models: arti cial neural network (ANN), decision tree (DT), naïve bayes (NB) and support vector machine (SVM). e decision tree algorithm achieved the best accuracy of 94.3% with less than 4% of false-positives.
Another type of features is generated using the disassembly of a PE le and extracting opcode n-grams. e use of opcode n-grams to classify malware was suggested by [16] . e authors examined di erent sizes of n-grams ranging from three to six, as well as three feature selection methods. To classify the les, they used several models such as ANN, DT, Boosted DT, NB and Boosted NB. e best results achieved by the DT and the Boosted DT models, with more than 93% accuracy, less than 4% false-positives and less than 17% false-negatives.
Lastly, the PE format (i.e., metadata) can be used to represent the PE le [1, 5, 19] . e format of PE les has a well-de ned structure, which includes information necessary to the execution process, as well as some additional data (such as versioning info and creation date). In [19] , the authors used seven features extracted from the PE headers to classify malicious les: DebugSize, ImageVersion, IatRVA, ExportSize, ResourceSize, VirtualSize2, and NumberOfSections. e study presents the results of multiple machine learning algorithms used for classifying the PEs: IBK, Random Forest, J48, J48 Gra , Ridor and PART. e evaluation results show similar performance for all classi ers, reaching an accuracy of up-to 98.56% and a false-positive rate as lower as 5.68%.
Reinforcement Learning in Security Domains
Reinforcement learning is used in the security domains mainly for adversarial learning and malware detection. In the eld of adversarial learning, RL can be successfully used to modify malware les as to be er avoid detection [1] . is goal was achieved by a acking static analysis detector while equipping the agent with a set of malicious functionality-preserving operations.
In the malware detection domain, Silver et al. [3] presented a proof of concept for an adaptive rule-based malware detection framework. e proposed framework employs a learning classi er systems combined with a rule-based expert system. e VirusTotal online malware detection service served as the PE le malware classi er, using multiple static PE le feature for detection. A reinforcement learning algorithm was then used to determine weather a PE is malicious.
In their paper, Mohammadkhani and Esmaeilpour [15] used RL for classifying di erent malware types using a set of features commonly used by anti virus so ware. A similar example in the same domain was presented by [31] for optimizing malware detection on mobile devices. e authors used reinforcement learning to control the o oading rate of application traces to the security server, an optimization that is critical for mobile devices. e proposed solution consisted of a deep Q-network coupled with a deep convolutional neural network.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this research we have presented ASPIRE, a RL-based approach for malware detection. Our approach dynamically and iteratively assigns various detectors to each le, constantly performing costbene t analysis to determine whether the use of a given detector is "worth" the expected reduction in classi cation uncertainty. e entire process is governed by the organizational policy, which sets the rewards/costs of correct and incorrect classi cations and also de nes the cost of computational resources.
When compared to existing ensemble-based solution, our approach has two main advantages. First, it is highly e cient, since easy-to-classify les are likely to require the use of less-powerful classi ers, a fact that gives us the ability to maintain near-optimal performance at a fraction of the computing cost. As a result, it is possible to analyze a much larger number of les without increasing hardware capacity. Secondly, organizations can clearly and easily de ne and re ne their security policy by explicitly se ing the costs of each element of the detection process: correct/incorrect classi cation and resource use. Since the value of each outcome is clearly quanti ed, organizations can easily experiment with different values and ne-tune the performance of their models to the desired outcome.
In future work, we intent to explore several directions. First, we would like to increase the number of detectors and integrate a dynamic analysis component in our environment.
e use of dynamic analysis involves multiple challenges (for example, se ing up the required environments and their analysis) and is therefore a challenging eld of research. Secondly, we would like to explore the use of our approach in a transfer learning se ing, where a model trained on set of detectors is used as shorten the required training period for other con gurations.
